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William Henslee"
I. INTRODUCTION1
Since Napster made mass digital downloads and online piracy
available and accessible in June of 1999,2 the music industry has been
under attack. This attack on traditional music sales and practices has
created intense financial pressures for record companies and artists
alike. Other factors affecting the changing landscape of the music busi-
ness include: piracy; a harsh retail environment; radio consolidationr'
• Associate Professor of Law and founding faculty member, Florida A&M University College
of Law. B.A., University of Hawaii; J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law; M.F.A., University
of California, Los Angeles Graduate School of Theater, Film, & Television. Special thanks to my
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1. According to the United States Copyright Office website:
Marybeth Peters became the United States Register of Copyrights on August 7, 1994.
From 1983 to 1994 she held the position of policy planning adviser to the register. She has
also served as acting general counsel of the Copyright Office and as chief of both the Exam-
ining and Information and Reference divisions. Peters is a frequent speaker on copyright
issues; she is the author of The General Guide to the Copyright Act of1976. She delivered
the 2004 Brace Memorial Lecture (at New York University School of Law) and the 1996
Horace S. Manages Lecture at Columbia University School of Law. She serves on the In-
tellectual Property Advisory Committees of several law schools.
Peters received her undergraduate degree from Rhode Island College and her law de-
gree, with honors, from The George Washington University Law School. She is a member
of the bar of the District of Colum bia.
United States Copyright Office, Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights. Biographical Information,
aveilablc athttp://www.copyright.gov/docs/mbpbio.html(last visited Oct. 4,2008).
2. Nspster's High and Low Notes, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 14,2000, at 113, available athltp:11
www.businessweek.com/2000/00_33/b3694003.htm; see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
3. Radio consolidation is the purchasing of independent and local radio stations by larger cor-
porations. See Media Ownership: Radio Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transp., 108th Congo (Jan. 30, 2003) (statement of Don Henley on Behalf of the Recording
Artists' Coalition), available nt http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/henleyOI3003.pdf. In his testimony,
Don Henley, representing the Recording Artists' Coalition, stated:
As local and independent radio stations were purchased by larger corporations, radio play-
lists started to contract and become much more uniform. In an effort to gain more control
over the music industry, radio conglomerates started to narrow playlists and centralize the
radio programming function that had traditionally been done independently by each indi-
vidual station. Radio consolidation made it increasingly more difficult for an artist to get
radio airplay. Radio network programmers became more powerful and demanding. And
not only did they erode the vitality of American music, they placed themselves in a singu-
larly powerful position to extract additional concessions from the labels and the artists.
ld
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declining compact disc (CD) sales; challenges to the legitimate digital
marketplace; and limited online retail markets." CD album sales de-
clined 18.8% in 2007 and overall album sales-including digital format
sales-dropped to 500 million units, the lowest it had been in twenty-
five years.'
As album sales decreased, individual digital song sales increased.
There were 844.1 million downloaded tracks in 2007-a 45% rise from
2006-and 50 million digital albums sold-a 53.5% increase." "U.S. al-
bum sales sank another 11% during the first half of 2008 from a year
earlier, according to Nielsen SoundScan. That included a 16.3% plunge
in CD sales."? Digital track sales have increased, but "the rate of
growth has slowed from 48 percent in mid-2007 to 30 percent this year.t"
Digital album sales are up 34.4% from January to June 2008.9 Third
quarter results continue to indicate a downward trend in music sales."
As digital sales continue to increase, the controversy surrounding how
record companies and artist royalties are distributed increases with
them. The standard artist royalty for digital sales is the same as for CD
sales: approximately 15% after recoupable costs, depending on the art-
ist's contract.'! During contract negotiations, many artists, managers,
and lawyers argue that a digital sale should be treated as a third-party
license because there are no packaging costs, warehousing costs, or
shipping costs required for a downloaded song or CDY Third-party li-
4. Statement of the Recording Indus. Assoc. ofAm., Inc., In re Mech. & Digital Phonorecord
Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceedings, No. 2006-3 CRB DPRA (filed Apr. 10,2007) (testimony of
Ron Wilcox, Executive Vice President and Chief Business and Legal Affairs Officer, Sony BMG Mu-
sic Entertainment), available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-3/riaa-wilcox-amended.pdf
[hereinafter Wilcox Testimony].
5. Ed Christman, Silverlinings, BILLBOARD, Jan. 12,2008, at 5.
6. Antony Bruno, Downloads to the Rescue: Digital Commerce Hits Record High in '07,
BILLBOARD, Jan. 12,2008, at 6.
7. Courtney Harding, Shop, Look, Listen: Nontraditional Retailers Still See Value in CDs,
BILLBOARD, Aug. 2,2008, at 7.
8. Midyear Music Biz Report Card, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 7, 2008, at 12.
9. Id
10. Ed Christman, Glass HalfFull, BILLBOARD, Oct. 3, 2008, at 6 ("Combined U.S. sales of al-
bums and track-equivalent albums (or TEA, where 10 digital tracks equal an album) totaled 377.4
million units during the nine months ending Sept. 28, down 5.3% from 398.6 million units during the
same period last year, according to Nielsen SoundScan. That marked a steeper fall than the 4.7%
year-on-year sales drop recorded during the first half of 2008, which was about half the 9.1% decline
posted during the year-earlier period."), available athttp://billboard.biz/bbbiz/contenCdisplay/
industry/e3i2db03fb29d573ec50268520847bge79f?imw=Y.
11. Antony Bruno, Strength in Numbers: Moves Are Afoot to Improve Recording Artists' Col-
lective Leverage, BILLBOARD, July 26,2008, at 7.
12. Id Consider, for example, this contract provision, currently on file with the author between
a major record label and a hip-hop group:
7.02(a) With respect to Electronic Transmissions of Masters hereunder sold or licensed for
sale in the United States by [Company] at a price that falls within [Company's] top-line
price category applicable to such method of exploitation, your royalty will be a percentage
of the applicable Royalty Base Price where such percentage equals the applicable royalty
rate set forth in subparagraph 7.01(a) above for the Master concerned (irrespective of
whether or not the Record being so exploited constitutes an Album hereunder), and such
applicable percentage shall be deemed to be the United States Basic Rate for such method
of exploitation. With respect to Electronic Transmissions of Masters hereunder exploited
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cense revenues, i.e. film, television, and advertising, are split 50-50,
which is significantly more than the album royalty rate.':' Record com-
panies have been reluctant to change their accounting practices to share
additional revenue with their artists and have always made their profits
from the talents of their artists" and songwriters.15
Traditionally, record companies have received their revenue from
phonorecord'" sales and use of the music in film, television, and adver-
tisements." Performers have received their income from record com-
panies based on a percentage of the sales income after the company has
recouped its investment in the artist." Performers also receive income
outside the United States andlor at a price that does not fall within [Company's] top-line
price category applicable to such method of exploitation, the otherwise applicable other
provisions of this Article 7 ....
7.02(b) With respect to audio-only compact discs and Electronic Transmissions of Masters
hereunder, the royalty rate (which will be deemed to be the Basic Rate with respect to such
configuration or method of exploitation) is one hundred percent (100%) of the otherwise
applicable royalty rate in the applicable country for the configuration and price category
concerned....
7.03(b) With respect to Ancillary Exploitation or any exploitation of Website Material,
ECD Material exploited separate and apart from a Record, or Mobile Material for which
[Company] receives a royalty or other payment which is directly attributable to such Ancil-
lary Exploitation or exploitation of Website Material, ECD Material, or Mobile Material,
your royalty will be an amount equal to a percentage of [Company's] Net Receipts from
such royalty or other payment where such percentage equals the applicable Basic Rate set
forth in paragraph 7.01(c) above if the Ancillary Exploitation or exploitation of such Web-
site Material, ECD Material, or Mobile Material is made outside of the United States.
13. Bruno, Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 7. See Contract, on file with author, supra
note 12:
7.03(c) With respect to any use of a Master by [Company] or license of a Master hereunder
by [Company] of which [Company] receives a royalty or other payment which is directly at-
tributable to such use or license and where a royalty or other payment for such use or li-
cense is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in this Article 7, your royalty will
be the sum equal to fifty percent (50%) of [Company's] Net Receipts from such royalty or
other payment.
14. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Congo (Apr. 3, 2001) (statement
of Don Henley on behalf of the Recording Artists Coalition) ("A new artist agreement is one-sided
in favor of the labels .... [A] typical artist could sell a half million records and not see one dollar in
royalties. ").
15. See Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Props. ofthe S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo (July 12, 2005) (statement of Rick Carnes, President of the
Songwriters' Guild of America) [hereinafter Carnes Statement] ("Stephen Foster, America's first
professional songwriter, died in poverty with 38 cents in his pocket at the age of 37.").
16. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1976) ("'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than
those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual, are fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'phonorecords' includes the
material object in which the sounds are first fixed."),
17. These are traditional forms of third-party licenses. See Contract cl. 7.03(c), supra note 12
(covering all uses not specifically mentioned). Also, regarding sales, consider the following provision
from the contract for a major record label, on file with author:
7.01(a) Subject to the other provisions of this Article 7, on USNRC Net Sales of Albums:
(1) On Masters made during the initial Contract Period, first Option Period and second
Option Period: X% ('the Basic Rate').
14.21 '''Master,' 'Master Recording' or 'Recording' -any recording of sound, whether or
not coupled with a visual image, by any method and on any substance or material, whether
now or hereafter known, that is or is intended to be embodied on a Record."
Id
18. See id. § 8.01. "[Company] will compute your royalties as of each June 30 and December 31
for the prior six (6) months, in respect of each six (6) month period in which there are sales or returns
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from touring'? and merchandising.i'' Prior to 1995, neither record com-
panies nor performers collected performance royalties." Performance
royalties have traditionally been paid only to music publishing compa-
nies and songwriters after those royalties were collected by the per-
formance rights societies."
With the current technology and digital marketing available, artists
are trying to reform the record industry in attempts to get greater roy-
alty rates." Several artists have produced albums without the help of a
major record label." While the artists attempt to release directly to the
consumer, the top two retailers, Wal-Mart and iTunes, put pressure on
the bottom line of record labels trying to keep their margins Up.25 Addi-
tionally, artists face pressure from their record labels because "hits" are
the catalysts that drive sales."
of Records or other exploitations of Masters on which royalties are payable to you." Id
19. See id. § 9A.01. "[Company] is hereby entitled to a royalty equal to [X] percent (X%)
("Tour Participation Percentage") of the Net Revenues earned in connection with Concert Dates
throughout the United States and, subject to the terms and conditions of this article 9A, during the
term hereof." Id
20. See id. § 9A.03(a).
"Tour Merchandise Rights" shall mean the right to sell to the public on the site of Artist's
Concert Dates all types of products and merchandise (including, without limitation, T-
shirts, sweatshirts, hats, buttons, bumper stickers, key chains, posters, books, and the like
and any other agreed products) embodying an element of the professional name of Artist,
other names referring to Artist, photographs, likenesses of and/or biographical material
concerning Artist, and/or any words, symbols or other identification of Artist of every kind,
as well as copyrights, trademarks, trade names, service marks, artwork, logos, designs, and
similar properties of or relating to Artist as a collective or the professional recording career
of Artist, including any material prepared by [Company] in connection with the sale of re-
cordings hereunder containing Artist's performance.
21. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 3(g),
109 Stat. 336,342.
22. "Performance rights societies" include The American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Producers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and Society of European Stage Authors &
Composers (SESAC). See discussion of performance rights societies infra Section III.
23. Evan Serpick, NIN, Eagles. Pumpkins: Who Needs Labels?, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 17,
2008, at 11; cf. Allman v. Sony BMG Music Entrn't, No. 06 CY 3252(GBD), 2008 WL 2477465, at *1
(S.D. N.Y. June 18,2(08) (dismissing a class action claim by recording artists seeking fifty percent of
the royalties collected from music downloads and ringtones via digital transmissions).
24. Serpick, supra note 23, at 11 ("In the past year, artists including Radiohead, Madonna, Nine
Inch Nails. the Eagles and the Black Crowes have all released-or announced plans to release-
music without a major label.").
25. See Wilcox Testimony, supra note 4 ("Apple's iTunes Music Store is by far the most popu-
lar online site for downloading songs legally. It accounts for more than 80% of online permanent
download sales ..., and like Wal-Mart, Apple exerts considerable downward price pressure. Because
of Apple's dominant position in this market segment, three years after the launch of iTunes we are
still hard pressed to raise wholesale prices for even a limited number of online downloads. More-
over, to compete with Apple, other competitors in the music download market have set their retail
prices below Apple's 99 cent price. For example, Wal-Mart sells downloads for 88 cents on its web-
site."); Steve Knepper, Wal-Mart Demands CD-Price Cut, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 3, 2008, at 16
("Wal-Mart, the nation's largest music retailer, has threatened to stop selling CDs entirely if the ma-
jor record labels don't drastically slash prices ....").
26. See Rich Cohen, The Last Record Man, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 21, 2008, at 61 (describing
the feud between performer Kelly Clarkson and producer Clive Davis over the record, My Decem-
ber. Clive told Clarkson, "[H]e did not like it. Because he did not hear any hits." The article goes
on to state, "The album ... lacked a radio-friendly single. Clarkson canceled her tour because of
poor ticket sales [and] fired her manager ...." Clive responded, "The record had no hits-that's
what mattered.").
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All of the players in the music business believe that the revenue
distribution models need to change but, to date, have been reluctant to
agree on how to implement that change." In an effort to reform the
music business and to continue its profitability, record companies, music
publishing companies, performing rights societies, artists, and songwrit-
ers have lobbied Congress to implement meaningful change. There
have been three recent bills submitted to the House and Senate. The
first bill, Section 115 Reform Act of 2006, sought to require listeners of
digital music to acquire a new license for each incidental copy, or copies,
of the media made by the act of downloading the music." Congress did
not enact the bill. It died in the House." In the 110th Congress, meet-
ing in 2007, the legislature introduced the Performance Rights Act,
which sought to create a public performance right in sound recordings."
The Act intends to provide parity between the owners of the copyrights
in the musical works and the owners of the copyrights in the sound re-
cordings by creating sound recording performance rights under 17
U.S.c. § 114.31 A similar bill, introduced the same day, is currently in
the Senate." Neither bill has been scheduled for debate.P
This article will discuss some of the major changes proposed to 17
U.S.c. §§ 114 and 115. Part II presents a brief history of compulsory li-
censes as background for the current state of the law and the perceived
need for change. Part III provides a summary of Marybeth Peters' pro-
posals. Part IV discusses the current status of § 114 and the pending leg-
islation to expand the scope of performance royalties for sound re-
cordings. Part V contains the author's proposals to modify Sections 107,
114, and 115.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPULSORY LICENSES
This section will provide a brief overview of the development of the
compulsory license provisions now included in the Copyright Act. 34 In
27. See Wilcox Testimony, supra note 4, at 23 ("These problems go as far back as 1999-2000,
when publishers refused to issue licenses for downloads and subscription services until industry
agreements were negotiated between [the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.] and [the
National Music Publishers' Association].").
28. H.R. 5553, 109th Congo (2006).
29. GovTrack.us, H.R. 5553 [I09thI Section 115 Reform Act of2006, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h I09-5553 (last visited Oct. 4,2008).
30. H.R. 4789, 110th Congo (2007).
31. Id.
32. Performance Rights Act, S. 2500, 110th Congo (2007).
33. See GovTrack.us, S. 2500: Performance Rights Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=s110-2500 (last visited Oct. 4, 2008); GovTrack.us, H.R. 4789: Performance Rights Act,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hll0-4789 (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
34. See Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo (June 21, 2005) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), svnilable at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat062105
.html [hereinafter Peters' June 21 Statement]; see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of
Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673,679-98 (2003) (providing a history of the musical
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doing so, it discusses how case law first acknowledged the need for such
provisions, and how those needs were addressed, in part, by the 1909
and 1976 Copyright Acts. The section concludes with a call for change
in the current law.
A. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.
When Justices Day and Holmes wrote separately in White-Smith
Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo CO.,35 they recognized the need for Con-
gress to modify the Copyright Act of 1891 to keep up with technology."
The Justices held that courts would not recognize as infringement the
manufacture and sale of perforated rolls used in connection with me-
chanical player pianos to reproduce sounds of copyrighted musical com-
positions." In White-Smith, the perforated rolls were a relatively new
technology, and the copyright infringement suit pitted technological in-
novators against composers and music publishers who were attempting
to protect their intellectual property and enforce their rights." The
Court looked to the legislative history to determine the intended defini-
tion of "copy" and stated, for the purposes of the Act, that the perfo-
rated rolls were not copies.'? Because the Copyright Act was intended
to protect physical copies that could be read by individuals, and the per-
work copyright from 1831 through 2003).
35. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
36. Id. at 9 (construing Rev. St. U.S. § 4952 (U.S. Compo Stat. Supp. 1907 p. 1021)). Justice Wil-
liam Day wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 8. In his concurring opinion, Justice Oliver Holmes
stated:
A musical composition is a rational collocation of sounds apart from concepts, reduced to a
tangible expression from which the collocation can be reproduced either with or without
continuous human intervention. On principle anything that mechanically reproduces that
collocation of sounds ought to be held a copy, or if the statute is too narrow ought to be
made so by a further act, except so far as some extraneous consideration of policy may op-
pose.
Id. at 19-20.
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id. at 9. The Court stated:
The manufacture of such instruments [musical instruments adapted to play perforated
rolls) and the use of such musical rolls has developed rapidly in recent years in this country
and abroad. The record discloses that in the year 1902 from seventy to seventy-five thou-
sand of such instruments were in use in the United States, and that from one million to one
million and a half of such perforated musical rolls, to be more fully described hereafter,
were made in this country in that year.
It is evident that the question involved in the use of such rolls is one of very consider-
able importance, involving large property interests, and closely touching the rights of com-
posers and music publishers.
Id.
39. Id. at 16-17. The Court stated:
A musical composition is an intellectual creation which first exists in the mind of the com-
poser; he may play it for the first time upon an instrument. It is not susceptible of being
copied until it has been put in a form which others can see and read. The statute has not
provided for the protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced,
however meritorious such conception may be, but has provided for the making and filing of
a tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it is the purpose of the
statute to protect the composer.
Id. at 17.
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forated rolls could only be read by a few, highly-trained technicians, the
rolls were unprotected." The majority opinion closed by stating, "But
such considerations properly address themselves to the legislative and
not the judicial branch of the government. As the act of Congress now
stands we believe it does not include these records as copies or publica-
tions of the copyrighted music involved in these cases.?"
B. The 1909 Copyright Act
In the 1909 Copyright Act,42 Congress responded to the challenge
raised in White-Smith by including a statutory definition of a "compul-
sory license.v" In section 1(e), Congress granted copyright owners pro-
tection for mechanical reproductions (or phonorecords) by providing
that anyone could make or distribute a phonorecord based on the copy-
right owner's musical work by paying a statutory fee." This section es-
tablished the first official compulsory license." Under the plain lan-
guage of the statute, no one could utilize the compulsory license until
the copyright owner authorized the first phonorecord." The clear statu-
tory language stated that any secondary user wishing to record a musical
work by using a compulsory license must send a "notice to use" to the
copyright holder and the United States Copyright Office." The copy-
right language was interpreted to require the original copyright holder
to use the work in a mechanical reproduction and then file notice with
the Copyright Office, which served as notice to potential users that the
work was available for a compulsory license." This simultaneously pre-
40. Id at17-18. "These musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye." Id. at17.
41. Id at18.
42. 17 U.S.C §§ 1-216 (1909).
43. See, e.g., id § 4.
44. Id §l(e)("[A]s a condition ofextending the copyrighted control to such mechanical repro-
ductions, that whenever the owner ofa musical copyright has used orpermitted orknowingly acqui-
esced in the use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce me-
chanically the musical work, any other person may make similar use ofthe copyrighted work upon
the payment tothe copyright proprietor ofa royalty of2cents on each such part manufactured, tobe
paid by the manufacturer thereof ....").
45. See id; see also 17 U.S.C § 115(a)(2) (2006). This section provides:
Acompulsory license includes the privilege ofmaking a musical arrangement ofthe work
to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner ofinterpretation of the per-
formance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody orfundamental
character ofthe work, and shall not be subject to protection as aderivative work under this
title, except with the express consent ofthe copyright owner.
46. 17U.S.C§1(e)(1909).
47. Id at§J01(e). This section provided:
Whenever any person, in the absence of a license agreement, intends to use a copyrighted
musical composition upon the parts ofinstruments serving to reproduce mechanically the
musical work, relying upon the compulsory license provision ofthis title, he shall serve no-
tice ofsuch intention, by registered mail, upon the copyright proprietor at his last address
disclosed by the records ofthe copyright office, sending to the copyright office a duplicate
ofsuch notice.
Id
48. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 108 (1976) ("The [1909] law, though not altogether clear,
apparently bases compulsory licensing on the making orlicensing ofthe first recording [by the copy-
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served copyright owners' rights under the law and served as notice to
those wishing to reproduce it."
C The 1976 Copyright Act
Prior to enacting the Copyright Act of 1976,50 the House and Sen-
ate convened to discuss advancements in technology and necessary
changes to copyright and compulsory license law." Specifically, they
stated '''that a compulsory licensing system is still warranted as a condi-
tion for the rights of reproducing and distributing phonorecords of
copyrighted music,' but 'that the present system is unfair and unneces-
sarily burdensome of copyright owners, and that the present statutory
rate is too low.",52 Congress set forth numerous new conditions to re-
duce the burden of securing a compulsory license, including: (1) "a
compulsory license would be available to anyone as soon as 'phonore-
cords ... have been distributed to the public in the United States under
the authority of the copyright owner''';53 (2) a compulsory license may
only be obtained when the "primary purpose ... is to distribute them to
the public for private use";54 (3) the licensee cannot duplicate the sound
recording without the authorization of the copyright owner;55 (4) a mu-
sical work can be rearranged "'to the extent necessary to conform it to
the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved,' so
long as it does not 'change the basic melody or fundamental character of
the work''';56 (5) a licensee must "serve a '[N]otice of [I]ntention to ob-
tain a compulsory license" on the copyright owner "'before or within
[thirty] days after making [the] phonorecords,''' and, if the Copyright
Office does not have the owner's address, the notice must be served to
right holder], even if no authorized records are distributed to the public."); see also Music Licensing
Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. ofthe S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Congo (July 12, 2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) [hereinafter Peters'
July 12 Statement] ("[N]o one could take advantage of the compulsory license until the copyright
owner had authorized the first mechanical reproduction of the work.").
49. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 108 (1976).
50. 17 V.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1976).
51. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976). The report stated:
Since [1909] significant changes in technology have affected the operation of the copyright
law. Motion pictures and sound recordings had just made their appearance in 1909, and ra-
dio and television were still in the early stages of their development. During the past half
century a wide range of new technologies for capturing and communicating printed matter,
visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use, and the increasing use of informa-
tion storage and retrieval devices, communications satellites, and laser technology promises
even greater changes in the near future. The technical advances have generated new indus-
tries and new methods for the reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works, and
the business relations between authors and users have evolved new patterns.
Id
52. Id at 107.
53. fd at 108 (citing Copyright Act of 1976, S. 22, 94th Congo§ 115(a)(1), codified at 17 V.S.c. §
I15(a)(1) (2006».
54. fd.
55. fd at 108-09.
56. fd at 109.
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the Copyright Office;" (6) the copyright owner is entitled to receive
copyright royalties on the phonorecords "made" and "distributed" after
the copyright owner is identified in the registration of the Copyright Of-
fice;58 and (7) a compulsory license may be terminated for failure to pay
monthly royalties if a user fails to make payment within thirty days of a
receipt of a written notice on a defaulting licensee."
While this language in the Copyright Act of 1976 sufficed prior to
digital technology, the emergence of digital transmissions created a need
for the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.60
The intention of the 1995 Act was to extend the scope of compulsory li-
censes to cover the distribution of a phonorecord in a digital format."
The 1995 Act added a "digital phonorecord delivery" definition to 17
u.s.c § 115:
A "digital phonorecord delivery" is each individual delivery of a phonore-
cord by digital transmission of a sound recording which results in a spe-
cifically identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a
phonorecord of that sound recording ... or any nondramatic musical
work embodied therein. A digital phonorecord delivery does not result
from a real-time, non-interactive subscription transmission of a sound re-
cording where no reproduction of the sound recording or the musical
work embodied therein is made from the inception of the transmission
through to its receipt by the transmission recipient in order to make the
sound recording audible. 62
The definition acknowledges both rights of public performance and
reproduction or transmission.f In order to transmit a sound recording'"
57. Id
5R. Id at 110. The report noted:
The term "made" is intended to be broader than "manufactured," and to include within its
scope every possible manufacturing or other process capable of reproducing a sound re-
cording in phonorecords. The use of the phrase "made and distributed" establishes the ba-
sis upon which the royalty rate for compulsory licensing under section 115 is to be calcu-
lated ....
Id
59. Id at 111.
60. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat, 336 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.c.); S. REP.
No. 104-128, at 14 (1996). The report stated:
[IJn the absence of appropriate copyright protection in the digital environment, the
creation of new sound recordings and musical works could be discouraged, ultimately deny-
ing the public some of the potential benefits of the new digital transmission technologies.
The Committee believes that current copyright law is inadequate to address all of the issues
raised by these new technologies dealing with the digital transmission of sound recordings
and musical works and, thus, to protect the livelihoods of the recording artists, songwriters,
record companies, music publishers and others who depend upon revenues derived from
traditional record sales.
In particular, the Committee believes that recording artists and record companies can-
not be effectively protected unless copyright law recognizes at least a limited performance
right in sound recordings.
S. REP. No. 104-128, at14 (1996).
61. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congo (Mar. 11, 2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights) [hereinafter Peters' March 11 Statement]' available athttp://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/
peters031104.pdf.
62. 17 U.S.c. § 115(d) (2006).
63. Peters' March 11 Statement, supra note 61. In her testimony, she stated:
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digitally, the broadcaster must obtain a mechanical license from the
copyright owner of the musical work and pay the performance royalty
created by 17 U.S.c. § 114. Many music industry professionals suggest
that change is necessary to avoid the perceived double dipping.f Mary-
beth Petersj" United States Register of Copyrights, has testified before
Congress numerous times concerning possible reforms for compulsory
licenses and performing rights royalties."
D. Why There Must Be Change
Since the mid-1990s, digital music services have had the right to use
compulsory licenses to acquire the rights to already-recorded phonore-
cords and deliver these phonorecords to consumers/" A two-track li-
censing system has developed whereby digital music providers must ob-
tain a license for the public performance rights from a performing rights
society and another license for the distribution rights from the copyright
owners." Digital transmissions implicate both performance rights and
distribution rights, and "licensees end up paying twice for the right to
make a digital transmission of a single work.,,7o The two-step process
creates increased transactional costs." The increased transactional costs
mean a decrease in profitability for the record cornpanies.P Addition-
ally, these transactional costs are possibly one reason why the illegal
download services, or free services, have been so popular.P
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court, in MGM v. Groksterl"
held that when one distributes a device that can be used to infringe
copyright, it is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third par-
Congress made changes to Section 115 to meet the challenges of providing music in a digi-
tal format when it enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
("DPRA"), ... which also granted copyright owners of sound recordings an exclusive right
to perform their works publicly by means of a digital audio transmission, ... subject to cer-
tain limitations .... The amendments to Section 115 clarified the reproduction and distri-
bution rights of music copyright owners and producers and distributors of sound re-
cordings, especially with respect to what the amended Section 115 termed "digital
phonore cord deliveries." Specifically, Congress wanted to reaffirm the mechanical rights of
songwriters and music publishers in the new world of digital technology.
ld
64. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1976) (providing, "'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixa-
tion of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks,
tapes, or other phon ore cords, in which they are embodied. ").
65. Peters' July 12 Statement, supra note 48.
66. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g.,Peters' July 12 Statement, supra note 48; see a/so17 U.S.c. §§ 114-115(2006).
68. 17 U.S.c. § 115 (2006) (amended in 1995); see generally Peters' July 12 Statement, supra
note 48.




73. Id Examples of "free services" include Napster, KaZaa, Grockster, and StreamCast.
74. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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ties." Grokster and its co-defendant StreamCast "distribute[d] free
software products that allow[ed] computer users to share [copyrighted
material] through peer-to-peer networks.t'" During discovery, MGM
found that billions of files were shared across peer-to-peer networks
each month."? After A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,78 Grokster
and StreamCast promoted and marketed themselves as Napster alterna-
tives,"" In Grokster, neither defendant received any revenue from its
users; however, they generated income by selling advertising space and
streaming it to their users.f" Additionally, both companies were aware
of the infringement, "voiced the objective that recipients use the soft-
ware to download copyrighted works, and took active steps to encour-
age infringement. ,,81
Looking at the number of illegal downloads and their frequency,
the Court found the argument for indirect liability persuasive.F The
Court stated, "When a widely shared service or product is used to com-
mit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected
work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alterna-
tive being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secon-
dary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement. "83
The Court defined "contributory liability" as "intentionally inducing or
encouraging direct infringement," and defined "vicarious liability" as
"profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to
stop or limit it.,,84 Advertising an infringing use for a product, or in-
structing on how to engage in an infringing use with a product, are evi-
dence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement.f The ad-
vertising and instruction by Grokster and StreamCast showed an
75. Id. at 919.
76. Id. A peer-to-peer network communicates directly with other computers, which eliminates
the need for a central computer server. Id. at 920. Additionally, the high-bandwidth communications
capacity for a server can be dispensed with, making costly server storage unnecessary. Id.
77. Id. at 923.
78. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Napster was found liable for copyright infringement after the
court established that its Internet service facilitated the transmission and retention of digital audio
files by its users. Specifically, Napster interfered with the copyright holders' exclusive rights of re-
production per 17 U.S.c. § 106(1), and distribution per 17 U.S.c. § 106(3). Id. at 1014.
79. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913. Additionally, Stream Cast gave away a software program known
as OpenNap, designed to be comparable to Napster software. Id. at 924. "Evidence indicates that it
was always Stream Cast's intent to use its OpenNap network to be able to capture email addresses of
its initial target market so that it could promote its Stream Cast Morpheus interface to them." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
80. Id. at 926.
81. Id. at 913.
82. Id. at 927. The Court overturned Groksteron the basis that the lower court misread Sony
Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which held that distribution of
a commercial product capable of substantial noninfringing uses did not give rise to contributory li-
ability for infringement unless the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringe-
ment and failed to act on that knowledge. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 927.
83. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-30.
84. Id. at 930.
85. Id. at 936.
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affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and thus over-
came the law's reluctance to find liability when a defendant sells a prod-
uct suitable for a lawful usc."
On September 28, 2005, three months after Grokster was decided,
Marybeth Peters delivered a statement to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary at its hearing on "Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a
Post-Grokster World.,,87 Peters described the Grokster decision as
"hav[ing] encouraged productive negotiations and agreements within
the music industry, ultimately benefiting the music consumer by making
it easier to legitimately obtain music online.,,88 The essential problem is
that requiring two licenses from different rights-holders for a single
transmission of a single work is inefficient; Peters advocates for Con-
gress to change this law to create an efficient and effective system of li-
censlng."
III. MARYBETH PETERS' PROPOSALS
In her initial 2004 testimony before a congressional subcommittee,
Peters outlined several options to reconcile the compulsory license pro-
visions with emerging and existing digital technology." First, Peters
suggested eliminating the compulsory license." Peters stated that all
other countries that had a similar compulsory license-except the
United States and Australia-have eliminated the license from their
copyright laws." She justified this by stating, "A compulsory license
limits an author's bargaining power. It deprives the author of determin-
ing with whom and on what terms he wishes to do business.t''" In its
place, Peters suggested a collective administration, modeled after the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Producers (ASCAP),94
Broadcast Music, Inc (BMI),95 and the Society of European Stage
Authors & Composers (SESAC),96 which would become Music Rights
86. Id at 939-40.
87. Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World' Hearing Before the S.








94. ASCAP was established in 1914 to collect performance royalties. ASCAP, About ASCAp,
http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). ASCAP has a membership association of
more than 330,000 composers, songwriters, lyricists, and music publishers throughout the United
States. Id.
95. BMI was established in 1939 to collect performance royalties. BMI, BMIJOJ, http://www
.bmi.com/about/Zlinkenavbar (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). BMI is a performing rights organization,
which collects license fees on behalf of its songwriters, composers. and music publishers and
distributes them as royalties to those members whose works have been performed. Id.
96. SESAC was established in 1930. SESAC, What is SESAC?, http://www.sesac.com/
writerpublisher/whatissesac.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). "SESAC, Inc. is a performing rights
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Organizations (MRO), and which would license all rights related to
making musical works available to the public." "As a matter of princi-
ple, [she] believe[s] that the Section 115 license should be repealed and
that licensing of rights should be left to the marketplace, most likely by
means of collective administration. ,,98
Establishing an MRO capable of licensing all rights related to mak-
ing musical works available to the public is a good idea, and a detailed
discussion follows.?" Even though record companies rarely use compul-
sory licenses to obtain mechanical licenses from music publishing com-
panies.l'" eliminating the compulsory license provision and leaving the
rate setting to the marketplace is a bad idea because it would provide
yet another method for record companies to extract money from their
recording artists.l'" Most record contracts include a controlled compen-
sation clause that limits the amount paid to the artist for songs included
on the album.l'? Record companies cap the amount of money available
to pay mechanical royalties on a recording artist's behalf, while in a
separate section of the contract, the company requires a minimum num-
ber of songs103 and a minimum number of minutes to satisfy those re-
organization with headquarters in Nashville and offices in New York, Los Angeles, Atlanta, [Miami]
and London." Id
97. Peters' Mar. 11 Statement, supra note 61.
98. Id
99. See infra Section V.E.
100. See Wilcox Testimony, supra note 4 ("However, the compulsory license is so burdensome to
rely on that it was not a practical option for us."); see also Written Direct Statement ofthe Recording
Indus. Assoc. ofAmerica, Inc., In re Mech. & Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Pro-
ceedings, No. 2006-3 CRB DPRA, at vol. I, tab A, p. 9 (filed Apr. 10,2007) (Introductory Memoran-
dum), available athttp://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-3/riaa-written.pdf (describing "the practi-
cal difficulties of the mechanical licensing system, in which the compulsory process is so burdensome
that it is almost never used").
101. See generally Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884,893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court stated:
As the facts stated above indicate, the contracts were hard bargains, signed by an artist
without bargaining power, and favored the publishers, but as a matter of fact did not con-
tain terms which shock the conscience or differed so grossly from industry norms as to be
unconscionable by their terms. The contracts were free from fraud and although complex
in nature, the provisions were not formulated so as to obfuscate or confuse the terms. Al-
though Jim Croce might have thought that he retained the right to choose whether to exer-
cise renewal options, this misconception does not establish that the contracts were unfair.
Id
102. See, e.g., Recording Contract Executed (Aug. 15,2007) (on file with author). The contract
reads, in part:
11.01.(a)(2) For that License, [Company] will pay you or your designee Mechanical Royal-
ties, on the basis of Net Sales, at the following rate (the 'Controlled Rate'): (A) On Re-
cords distributed in the United States: (i) If the copyright law of the United States provides
for a minimum compulsory rate: The rate equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the mini-
mum compulsory license rate applicable to the use of musical compositions on audio Re-
cords under the United States copyright law (hereinafter referred to as the 'U.S. Minimum
Statutory Rate') at the time of the commencement of the recording of the Master con-
cerned but in no event later than the last date for timely delivery of such Master (the appli-
cable date is hereinafter referred to as the 'Copyright Fixing Date'). (The U.S. Minimum
Statutory Rate is $.091 per Composition as of January 1,2006).
Id.
103. '''Album' or 'LP'-a sufficient number of Masters that qualify as Sides hereunder embody-
ing Artist's performances to comprise one (1) or more Compact Discs, or the equivalent, of not less
than forty-five (45) minutes of playing time and containing at least eleven (11) different composi-
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cording requirements.l'" If the bargaining power of the parties was not
so unbalanced in favor of the record company, the free market system
might work. But the transactional costs required to negotiate a separate
mechanical royalty rate for every song included on any album would
likely exceed any savings for the company and unduly burden copyright
owners. 105 Arguing that music-publishing companies have equal bar-
gaining power with the record companies ignores market realities and
ultimately punishes the recording artist who has a cap on the amount
the company will pay on the artist's behalf.l'"
Peters' second proposal is to change the language of § 115 to state
that "all reproductions of a musical work made in the course of a digital
phonorecord delivery are within the scope of the [§] 115 compulsory li-
cense.,,107 By doing this, the language would "provide expressly that all
reproductions that are incidental to the making of a digital phonorecord
delivery ... are included within the scope" of § 115.108 Some of these
ideas will be incorporated in this author's proposal below.l''?
Peters' third suggestion is to amend the law "to provide that repro-
ductions of musical works made in the course of a licensed public per-
formance are either exempt from liability or subject to a statutory li-
cense.,,110 Under the current statutes, "[w]hen a webcaster transmits a
public performance of a sound recording of a musical composition, the
webcaster must obtain a license from the copyright owner for the public
tions." fd
104. fd Record companies design these clauses to prevent an artist from using one song to sat-
isfy the album delivery requirement. Cl Robert Christgau & David Fricke, The 40 Essential Albums
of1967, ROLLING STONE, July 12-26,2007, at 133 (discussing Arlo Guthrie's "Alice's Restaurant," an
eighteen-minute song; Guthrie re-recorded the song and added four minutes for a CD release).
105. No one knows which song or songs on an album are ultimately going to drive album sales or
airplay before the record companies release the album. Assigning different mechanical rate values to
each song would make record company accounting more complicated and more obfuscated than it
already is. See generally DON PASSMAN, ALL You NEEDTO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS
(6th ed. 2006).
106. If the Controlled Compensation Clause is based on a rate lower than the statutory rate
through negotiations and the delivery requirement exceeds the cap in the Controlled Composition
Clause, the artist will have to pay the difference. See Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Controlled Com-
position Clauses, http://www.ascap.com/musicbizlmoney-c1auses.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
The website states:
[W]hen a writer/artist has recorded a substantial number of songs by other writers, he/she
has been put in a position of receiving no royalties for his/her own songs, since the aggre-
gate album-royalty maximum has been paid out to outside songwriters and publishers ....
But it can get even worse. There have actually been instances in which the writer/artist's
mechanical royalties have been in the minus column fOT every album sold because of the
operation of these controlled composition clauses. Additionally, the era of multiple re-
mixes has given rise to a clause which provides that the writer/artist will only receive a me-
chanical royalty for one use of his/her song regardless of the number of versions contained
on the single or album.
ld
107. Peters' Mar. 11 Statement, supra note 61.
108. Id: By including this, an individual could be charged several times for copies incidental to
the download, that the user or server could not access individually. ld; see17 V.S.c. § 115 (2006).
109. See discussion infra Section V.
110. Peters' Mar. 11 Statement, supra note 61.
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performance ....»ni Many of these public performance rights are con-
trolled by the public performance organizations ASCAP, BMI, or
SESAC.1l2 While these organizations control the public performance
rights, music publishers control reproduction rights associated with the
transmission of the performance.l" Webcasters currently must get li-
censes for both the public performance of the work and the right to re-
produce the work for transmission on the website.'!" Peters suggests
that this situation is parallel to when broadcasters use ephemeral re-
cordings'P of their transmission programs.!" Under 17 U.S.c. § 112(a),
broadcasters currently receive an exemption for these recordmgs.l'? Pe-
ters suggests it is inconsistent to allow broadcasters an exemption but
not allow webcasters an exemption for these similar recordings.!" As a
result, she states the licensed public performance should either be "ex-
empt from liability or subject to a statutory license."!" Similarly, this
author proposes that the public performance be subject to a statutory
license administered and collected by the MROs.120 This suggestion has
not been accepted by the Copyright Royalty Judges who are responsible
111. Id.; see 17 U.S.c. §§ 114-115.
112. See Peters' Mar. 11 Statement, supranote 61.
113. ld
114. See id
115. An "ephemeral recording" is not specifically defined in the Copyright Act, however, Con-
gress defined it in the legislative history as: "copies or phonorecords of a work made for purposes of
later transmission by a broadcasting organization legally entitled to transmit the work." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., at 101 (1976). The House Report also stated:
[T]he organization must have the right to make the transmission "under a license or trans-
fer of the copyright or make the limitations on exclusive rights in sound recordings speci-
fied by § 114(a)." Thus, except in the case of copyrighted sound recordings (which have no
exclusive performing rights under the bill), the organization must be a transferee or licen-
see (including compulsory licensee) of performing rights in the work in order to make an
ephemeral recording of it.
ld at 102.
116. Peters' Mar. 11 Statement, supranote 61.
117. Section 112 states:
(a)(I) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, and except in the case of a motion pic-
ture or other audiovisual work, it is not an infringement of copyright for a transmitting or-
ganization entitled to transmit to the public a performance or display of a work, under a li-
cense, including a statutory license under section 114(f), or transfer of the copyright or
under the limitations on exclusive rights in sound recordings specified by section 114(a), or
for a transmitting organization that is a broadcast radio or television station licensed as
such by the Federal Communications Commission and that makes a broadcast transmission
of a performance of a sound recording in a digital format on a nonsubscription basis, to
make no more than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission program em-
bodying the performance or display, if-
(A) the copy or phonorecord is retained and used solely by the transmitting organization
that made it, and no further copies or phonorecords are reproduced from it; and
(B) the copy or phonorecord is used solely for the transmitting organization's own trans-
missions within its local service area, or for purposes of archival preservation or security;
and
(C) unless preserved exclusively for archival purposes, the copy or phonorecord is de-
stroyed within six months from the date the transmission program was first transmitted to
the public.
17 U.S.c. § 112 (2006).
118. Peters' Mar. 11 Statement, supranote 61.
119. ld
120. See id.
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for setting rates.'?' Effective May 1, 2007, the Copyright Royalty Board
set the commercial webcaster rates for performances between 2006 and
2010.122 The Board also set a reduced rate for "small" and "noncom-
mercial" webcasters.V'
Peters' final suggestion is to expand the § 115 digital phonorecord
delivery license "to include both reproductions and performances of
nondramatic musical works in the course of either digital phonorecord
deliveries or transmissions of performances.t'V" This arises from the dis-
tinction between reproduction rights and performance rights, and from
the fact that online music services are asked to pay separately for each
of these rights.125 She suggests placing both uses under a single license
requiring a single payment.!" This author agrees with this proposal and
has incorporated it into the suggestions discussed below.!" Before Pe-
ters concluded her testimony, she listed some suggestions submitted by
interested parties.!" Some of those suggestions are also included be-
lOW.129
IV. PERFORMANCE RIGHTS UNDER § 114
Sound recordings did not receive protection until the Sound Re-
121. See 17 U.S.c. § 801 (2006) (defining the role of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the role
of the Copyright Royalty Judge); 17 USc. § 101 (defining a Copyright Royalty Judge as a judge
"appointed under section 802 of this title, and includes any individual serving as an interim Copyright
Royalty Judge under such section").
122. 37 c.F.R. § 380.3(a)(I) (2007) ("Commercial Webcasters: ... For all digital audio transmis-
sions, including simultaneous digital audio retransmissions of over-the-air AM or FM radio broad-
casts, a Commercial Webcaster will pay a performance royalty of: $.0008 per performance for 2006,
$.0011 per performance for 2007, $.0014 per performance for 2008, $.0018 per performance for 2009,
and $.0019 per performance for 2010.").
123. 37 C.F.R. § 380.3(a)(2) ("Noncommercial Webcasters: (i) For all digital audio transmissions
totaling not more than 159,140 Aggregate Tuning Hours (ATH) in a month, including simultaneous
digital audio retransmissions of over-the-air AM or FM radio broadcasts, a Noncommercial Web-
caster will pay an annual per channel or per station performance royalty of $500 in 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009 and 2010."); see ROBIN JEWELER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, STATUTORY ROYALTY RATES FOR "SMALL" WEBCASTERS: DECISIONS OF THE
COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD, I 10th Congo(Mar. 23, 2007), available athllp:lIlieberman.senate.
gov/documents/crs/Webcasters.pdf.
124. Peters' June 21 Statement, supra note 34.
125. Id
126. See id. (stating that "it seems inefficient to require a licensee to seek out two separate li-
censes from two separate sources" with regard to one transmission of a work).
127. See discussion infra Section V.
128. Peters' June 21 Statement, supra note 34. These included: adoption of a model similar to a
§ 114 webcasting license; a[e]stablishment of a collective to receive and disburse royalties under the
[§] lIS license"; establishment of a single entity which receives notices to use and royalties; creation
of an electronic database of all musical works registered with the copyright office; shifting the burden
of obtaining the rights to the sound recording copyright owner; "[c]reation of a safe harbor for those
who fail to exercise properly the license during a period of uncertainty arising from the administra-
tion of the license for the making of [digital phonore cord deliveries]"; "[e]xtension of the period for
effectuating service on the copyright owner or its agent" beyond 30 days; payment of royalties on a
quarterly rather than a monthly basis; and "[p]rovision for an offset of the costs associated with filing
Notices with the [United States Copyright] Office in those cases where the copyright owner wrong-
fully refuses service."
129. See discussion infra Section V.
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cording Act of 1971, when "Congress enacted a law ... that granted ex-
clusive rights of reproduction and distribution to copyright owners of
sound recordings.t'P" In 1972, this provision was challenged in a lawsuit
to enjoin the Attorney General and the Librarian of Congress from im-
plementing and enforcing the 1971 Act.':" The court found that a lim-
ited copyright in sound recordings was justified because it was designed
to protect against piracy.P''
The question of limited performance rights in sound recordings was
not conclusively decided until the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA).133 Prior to this legislation, there was
significant debate over limited performance rights.P' The purpose of
the DPRA was to "ensure that performing artists, record companies and
others whose livelihood depends upon effective copyright protection for
sound recordings, will be protected as new technologies affect the ways
in which their creative works are used.,,135 The DPRA was designed to
do this by granting a "limited right to copyright owners of sound re-
cordings which are publicly performed by means of a digital transmis-
sion.,,136 The royalty "create[ed] a carefully crafted and narrow per-
formance right, applicable only to certain digital transmissions of sound
130. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and InteJlectual Prop. of the H
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congo (2004) (statement of David O. Carson, general counsel, United
States Copyright Office) [hereinafter Carson Statement]; Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-140,85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.s.C.) ("To amend title
17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings
for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recording, and for
other purposes. ").
131. Shaab V. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972).
132. ld.; see also Goldstein V. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973) ("At any time Congress de-
termines that a particular category of 'writing' is worthy of national protection and the incidental ex-
penses of federal administration, federal copyright protection may be authorized.").
133. See Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.c.).
134. The committee report reveals this debate, stating:
The Committee considered at length the arguments in favor of establishing a limited per-
formance right, in the form of a compulsory license, for copyrighted sound recordings, but
concluded that the problem requires further study. It therefore added a new subsection (d)
to the bill requiring the Register of Copyrights to submit to Congress, on January 3, 1978,
"a report setting forth recommendations as to whether this section should be amended to
provide for performers and copyright owners ... any performance rights" in copyrighted
sound recordings. Under the new subsection, the report "should describe the status of such
rights in foreign countries, the views of major interested parties, and specific legislative or
other recommendations if any."
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 106 (1976) (citing Copyright Act of 1976, S. 22, 94th Congo § 114(d), codified
at 17 U.S.c. § 114(d) (1976» (omissions in original). Additionally:
Such rights are entirely consonant with the basic principles of copyright law generally, and
with those of the 1976 Copyright Act specifically. Recognition of these rights would elimi-
nate a major gap in this recently enacted general revision legislation by bringing sound re-
cordings into parity with other categories of copyrightable subject matter. A performance
right would not only have a salutary effect on the symmetry of law, but also would assure
performing artists of at least some share of the return realized from the commercial exploi-
tation of their recorded performances.
SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN
SOUND RECORDINGS, H.R. DOc. No. 15, at 177 (1978); see also Carson Statement, supra note 130;
H.R. REP. No. 104-274 (1995).
135. H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 10.
136. Id.
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recordings.t'P" Congress codified this right in 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).138
The digital performance right was restricted to interactive services and
subscription services, and created exemptions for over-the-air broad-
casts.!" In 1998, Congress revisited digital performance rights in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).140
Congress designed the DMCA to protect the growth of the Inter-
net and avoid bankruptcy of record companies by expanding § 114 li-
cense requirements.l'" These expanded sections specifically required
that: (1) the transmitting entity could not "induce" publication, or facili-
tate publication, by either announcing or publishing a play-list or song-
list in advance.P? (2) the transmitting entity must cooperate with copy-
right owners to prevent a "transmission recipient" or "other transmit-
ting entities" from automatically scanning for a particular sound re-
cording or artist;143 and (3) the transmitting entity cannot "interfere with
the transmission of technical measures that 'are widely used' by sound
recording copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted
works ....,,144 The Performance Rights Act, introduced in both the
House and Senate, is currently in committee.l'" These bills would pro-
vide a performance royalty for all performances of sound recordings.!"
137. Id at 12.
138. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 114,90 Stat. 2541,2560-61 (codified at 17
U.S.c. § 114(d)(2». This states:
STATUTORY LICENSING OF CERTAIN TRANSMISSIONS-The performance of a sound re-
cording publicly by means of a subscription digital audio transmission not exempt under
paragraph (1), an eligible nonsubscription transmission, or a transmission not exempt under
paragraph (1) that is made by a preexisting satellite digital audio radio service shall be sub-
ject to statutory licensing, in accordance with subsection (f) if-(A)(i) the transmission is
not part of an interactive service.
17 U.S.c. § 114(d)(2).
139. Id
140. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C).
141. See H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 80 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). The report stated:
The amendments to sections 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act that are contained in this
section of the bill are intended to achieve two purposes: first, to further a stated objective of
Congress when it passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
("DPRA") to ensure that recording artists and record companies will be protected as new
technologies affect the ways in which their creative works are used; and second, to create
fair and efficient licensing mechanisms that address the complex issues facing copyright
owners and copyright users as a result of the rapid growth of digital audio services.
Id.
142. 17 U.S.c. § 114(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2006). Congress designed this section to ensure that individu-
als would not know in advance what time a particular song would be played. See id. This prevented
them from setting a timed device to record the song automatically when it was transmitted. See id.
143. Id. § 114(d)(2)(v). Congress designed this section to prevent an individual, company, or
other entity from scanning a transmission to automatically record a song/artist when played. See id.
144. Id. § 114(d)(2)(viii) (internal quotations added). The objective of this change was to allow
for copyright owners to use technology to indicate when and how often their songs were being played
to ensure royalty payments. See id.
145. H.R. 4789, 110th Congo (2007); S. 2500, 1l0th Congo (2007); see GovTrack.us, Performance
Rights Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hll0-4789 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008);
GovTrack.us, Performance Rights Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-25oo (last
visited Sept. 28,2008).
146. H.R. 4789, 110th Congo (2007); S. 2500, 110th Congo(2007).
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V. A BEITER SOLUTION To THE PROBLEM
125
The following recommendations include many of Peters' sugges-
tions to construct a scheme that should provide market certainty for the
companies while also providing market certainty and income for artists
and copyright holders."? The Copyright Royalty Judges!" need to ad-
147. See Peters' June 21 Statement, supra note 34, at App. A. Peters submitted the following bill
to Congress:
This Act may be cited as the '[Twenty-First] Century Music Licensing Reform Act'.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS REVISED.
(a) Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by:
(i) deleting the definition of "performing rights society", and
(ii) adding the following definition:
'A "music rights organization" is an association, corporation, or other entity that is author-
ized by a copyright owner to license the public performance of nondramatic musical works.'
(b) Section 114 of Title 17, United States Code, is amended by:
(i) replacing the term "performing rights society" with "music rights organization" in clause
(d)(3)(C).
(ii) amending clause (d)(3)(E) to read in its entirety:
'(E) For purposes of this paragraph, a "licensor" shall include the licensing entity and any
other entity under any material degree of common ownership, management, or control that
owns copyrights in sound recordings.'
(c) Section 513 of Title 17, United States Code, is amended by replacing the term "perform-
ing rights society" with "music rights organization".
SEC. 3. REPEAL OF COMPULSORY MECHANICAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE FOR
NONDRAMATIC MUSICAL WORKS.
Section 115 of title 17, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: 'Sec. 115. Scope
of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works: Licensing of reproduction, distribution
and public performance rights 'In the case of nondramatic musical works, the exclusive
rights provided by clauses (1), (3) and (4) of section 106, to make phon ore cords of such
works, to distribute phonorecords of such works and to perform such works publicly, are
subject to the conditions specified by this section.
'(a) Licensing of reproduction and distribution rights by music rights organizations.-(1)A
lawful authorization to a music rights organization to license the right to perform a
nondramatic musical work includes the authorization to license the non-exclusive right to
reproduce the work in phonorecords and the right to distribute phonorecords of the work
to the public.
'(2) A license from a music rights organization to perform one or more nondramatic musi-
cal works publicly by means of digital audio transmissions includes the non-exclusive right
to reproduce the work in phonorecords and the right to distribute phonorecords of the
work to the public, to the extent that the exercise of such rights facilitates the public per-
formance of the musical work. A music rights organization that offers a license to perform
one or more nondramatic musical works publicly by means of digital audio transmissions
shall offer licensees use of all musical works in its repertoire, but the music rights organiza-
tion and a licensee may agree to a license for less than all of the works in the music rights
organization's repertoire.
'(3) No person shall authorize more than one music rights organization at a time to license
rights to a particular nondramatic musical work.
'(4) A music rights organization may recover, for itself or on behalf of a copyright owner,
statutory damages for copyright infringement only if such music rights organization has
made publicly available a list of the nondramatic musical works for which it has been
granted the authority to grant licenses, and such list included the infringed work at the time
the infringement commenced.
'(5) The rights and obligations of this subsection shall apply notwithstanding the antitrust
laws or any judicial order which, in applying the antitrust laws to any entity including a mu-
sic rights organization, would otherwise prohibit any licensing activity contemplated by this
subsection.
'(b) Other Licensing Agents.-Notwithstanding any authorization a music rights organiza-
tion may have to license nondramatic musical works, a copyright owner of a nondramatic
musical work may authorize, on a non-exclusive basis, any other person or entity to license
the non-exclusive right to make and distribute phonorecords of such work in a tangible me-
dium of expression but not by means of a digital audio transmission.
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just the statutory mechanical rate and set the statutory performance
royalty on a biannual basis.l'" Congress should pass legislation to codify
the performance royalty'i" and to add a compulsory sample royalty
rate. 151 In addition, Congress should modify the current fair use
clausel 52 to exclude music and adopt a fair use provision specifically for
music.P"
A. Retain the Statutory Rate
The statutory mechanical compulsory license rate has become the
de facto maximum rate that a music publisher or a copyright owner can
charge for a mechanical license.P" Congress should legislate a change,
establishing the rate as a minimum. This would benefit owners. The
Copyright Royalty Board released the mechanical royalty rates applica-
ble from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010, on October 2,
2008.155 Closing arguments for the Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord
Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceedings took place on July 24, 2008.156
'(c) Direct Licensing by a Copyright Owner-Nothing in this section shall prohibit the di-
rect licensing of a nondramatic musical work by its copyright owner on whatever rates and
terms to which it agrees.
'(d) Definition-As used in this section, the following term has the following meaning: A
"digital audio transmission" is a digital transmission, as defined in section 101, of a phon-
orecord or performance of a non dramatic musical work. This term does not include the
transmission of a copy or performance of any audiovisual work.
148. 17 V.S.c. § 101 ("A 'Copyright Royalty Judge' is a Copyright Royalty Judge appointed un-
der § 802 of this title, and includes any individual serving as an interim Copyright Royalty Judge un-
der such section."); 17 V.S.c. § 801(b)(1) (v[T'[he functions of the Copyright Royalty Judges shall be
as follows: (1) To make determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates as provided in
sections. ").
149. See discussion infra Section V.A.
150. See discussion infra Section V.B.
151. See discussion infra Section V.c.
152. 17 V.S.c. § 107 (2006). This clause states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id
153. See discussion infra Section V.D.
154. The current rate is 9.1 cents ($0.091), set by the Copyright Royalty Judges. See V.S. Copy-
right Office, Mechanical License Royalty Rates, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html(last vis-
ited Sept. 28, 2008) (containing a list of current and previous rates set by the Copyright Royalty
Judges).
155. In the Matter of Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording and Ephemeral Re-
cordings, No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Mar. 2,2007), available athttp://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/
2005-lIrates-terms2005-1.pdf; 17 V.S.c. § 804(b)(3)(A); see Ed Christman, Consensus Rules,
BILLBOARD, Oct. 11,2008, at 10.
156. Copyright Royalty Board: Docket 2006-3, http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-
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The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), supported by
its economic expert, Professor David J. Tccce.l'" proposed that the me-
chanical rate be changed from a penny rate to a percentage of wholesale
revenue.P" The rate he proposed was significantly below the current
statutory mechanical rate.P? His proposal was designed to allow record
companies to be more flexible with consumer pricing by allowing the re-
cord companies to reduce the amount of mechanical royalties paid to
songwriters.l'? If his proposed 7.8% rate had been accepted, copyright
owners and songwriters would have suffered significant losses in income
over the next few years.l'"
For Teece's proposal to benefit both record companies and copy-
right owners, the percentage needed to be higher so that songwriters did
not suffer an immediate loss of income per song. In addition to the new
rates, there must be a maximum number of songs permitted on each al-
bum, and there cannot be a reduction in the percentage through a con-
trolled composition clause.
Making the rate non-negotiable and not subject to reduction
through a controlled compositions clause or a cap on the amount of roy-
alties payable for mechanical licenses would benefit the songwriters
whose income is earned a few pennies at a time.162 Controlled compen-
sation clauses, included in almost every recording contract, limit art-
istS.163 The new rate for physical products and permanent downloads is
3lindex.html (last visited Sept. 28,20(8).
157. Professor David J. Teece received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pennsyl-
vania, and is "currently the Mitsubishi Bank Professor in the Haas School of Business and Director of
the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the University of California at Berkley,
and Director and Chairman of LECG, LLC (an international consulting firm)" and has published
"over 200 scholarly books and articles in the fields of industrial organization, technology manage-
ment, the valuation and management of intellectual property, and public policy." Testimony ofPro-
fessor David J. Teece, In re Mech. & Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceedings,
No. 2006-3 CRB DPRA, at 1 (Nov. 30,2(06), available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-
3/riaa-teece-amended.pdf [hereinafter Teece Statement).
158. Id at 69.
159. See id. Teece's proposed rate of 7.8% or less of the wholesale unit price will yield a much
lower return for a songwriter or copyright owner. Assuming the wholesale price is $7.00 per unit,
7.8% of the price equals $0.546. If the total royalty available is divided by 11 songs, as indicated in
the controlled composition clause, the amount payable per song is $0.0496 presuming no further dis-
counts are extracted by the record company. This is significantly less than the current $0.091 per
song, and less than the $0.068 (75%) rate.
160. See id
161. See id.
162. See Carnes Statement, supra note 15. This testimony stated:
[T)he U.S. statutory mechanical royalty rate was not raised from the 2 cent level for 69
years from 1909 to 1978. And for the last 27 years, modest increases to 8.5 cents have not
addressed that longstanding, bedrock inequity. The reason I am making less than
$16,000.00 on a million sales is that I am getting 1936 wages in 2005! ... More and more
songwriters simply can no longer afford to continue to expend the time and energy required
to practice their craft, while attempting to support their families.
163. Id This testimony stated:
[A) songwriter is to receive 8.5 cents per song on any CD ('phonorecord') manufactured
and distributed, or legally downloaded, in the United States. So, if one of my songs appears
on a million selling album, I am theoretically due $85,000 by statute. However, I split that
money half and half with my music publisher by contract. That leaves me $42,500. Then I
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the same as the old rate of nine point one cents ($0.091) per song.l'"
The judges set the rate for mastertone ringtones at twenty-four cents
($0.24) per mastertone, which was substantially higher than the fifteen
cents ($0.15) proposed by the National Music Publishers Association.P"
The Copyright Royalty Judges should continue to preserve the penny
rate and adjust it regularly to compensate for inflation and market
trends.l'"
B. Create a Non-assignable Performance Right for Performers
As discussed above, § 114 was amended to create a limited per-
formance right."? Congress is currently considering amending § 114 to
include a full performance royalty to benefit both the record companies
and the performers.l'" The proposed legislation should also make the
performer's performance royalty unassignable so that the record com-
panies do not take the income from the performer in order to recoup
recording costs."? For years artists have tried to change the way re-
cording contracts are structured without success.'?" The most commer-
cially successful artists have been unable to change the accounting prac-
must spilt [sic] that in half again with the recording artists who co-wrote the song with me,
leaving me with $21,250. Practically every artist now co-writes every song on his or her al-
bum with the primary songwriter, because the record labels have included a controlled
composition clause in every new artist's contract that makes it financially ruinous for the
artist to record more than one or two tracks that he or she did not co-write. The reason the
record companies do this is so they can pay the artist, and his or her co-writer, 75% of the
statutory mechanical royalty rate. Because of the controlled composition clause, and with
transaction costs deducted, my royalty income is reduced by thousands more dollars. Thus,
after all is said and done, I end up making less that $16,000 for having a song on a million
selling CD.
Id
164. In the Matter ofDigital Performance, supra note 155; 17 U.S.C. § 804(b)(3)(A); see Christ-
man, supra note 155, at 10.
165. In the Matter ofDigital Performance, supra note 155; 17 U.S.c. § 804(b)(3)(A); see Christ-
man, supra note 155, at 10.
166. Two cents ($0.02) in 1909 equals forty-six cents ($0.46) in 2007. S. Morgan Friedman, The
Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl (last visited Sept. 28, 2008). The current
9.1 cent ($.091) rate has not kept up with inflation. See id.
167. See discussion supra Section IV.
168. H.R. 4789, llOth Congo (2007); S. 2500, 1l0th Congo (2007); see GovTrack.us, Performance
Rights Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hllO-4789 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008);
GovTrack.us, Performance Rights Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-2500 (last
visited Sept. 28, 2008).
169. See Chuck Philips, Recording Stars Challenge Music Labels' Business Practices, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at A-I, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2001lmar/29/news/mn-44202
("Singer-songwriter Don Henley, co-founder of the Recording Artists Coalition, which represents
dozens of stars, including Eric Clapton, Joni Mitchell, Q-Tip, and Peggy Lee, said: 'Record compa-
nies have been screwing artists for ages.''').
170. See id. ("[Courtney] Love compares the plight of recording artists to that of movie stars be-
fore the founding of the Screen Actors Guild and baseball players before they launched their union.
Without collective bargaining clout, Love said, artists will never obtain health benefits or pension
plans to be able to stand up in any way to the Big Five music conglomerates which she said work to-
gether as an unlawful trust restraining trade and competition."). See generally Fred Goodman,
Courtney Love vs. The Music Biz, ROLLING STONE, June 7, 2001, at 25 (discussing the general dis-
pleasure among artists with recording contracts and the way music is distributed).
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tices of the major labels.'?' Because of the imbalance in bargaining
power between record companies and artists, if the performance royalty
is not unassignable, the record companies will demand that artists assign
the royalty to the company to help recoup the cost of the album.l"
While it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze fully the pro-
posed performance royalty fully, Congress should implement a non-
assignable performance royalty, collected by the new MROs on behalf
of the record companies and performing artists. The royalty should be
set by the Copyright Royalty Judges and should be in addition to the
statutory mechanical rate and the rates currently charged by the socie-
ties on behalf of the copyright owners for performance of the musical
works.l?' The additional rate should not diminish the income already
received by the songwriters and copyright owners.
C Create a Statutory Rate for Ssmples "
Congress should create a standard statutory rate for samples to
provide market certainty for sample use.175 In order to obtain clearance
for the use of a sample.l" the user/adapter must obtain a master use li-
cense for use of the sound recording and a mechanical license for use of
171. See Philips, supra note 169, at A-l ('''Not only do they cheat you on the way in,' [Merle]
Haggard said, 'they rob you on the way out. "'); see also Corey Moss, Mantell Jordan, Others Accuse
Labels ofAccounting Fraud, July 24, 2002, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1456242/2oo20724!
jordan_montell.jhtml.
172. See generally Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (discussing the assignment of the re-
newal term under the 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.c. § 24).
173. H.R. 4789, 1l0th Congo (2007); S. 2500, 11Oth Congo (2007); see GovTrack.us, Performance
Rights Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hllO-4789 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008);
GovTrack.us, Performance Rights Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-25oo (last
visited Sept. 28, 2008). Section 5(b) of both bills states: "Public Performance Rights and Royalties.-
Nothing in this Act shall adversely affect in any respect the public performance rights of or royalties
payable to songwriters or copyright owners of musical works."
174. Brown v. Columbia Recording Corp., No. 03 Civ. 6570, 2006 WL 3616966, *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2006). The court in Brown stated:
Digital sampling is a technique whereby a portion of an already existing sound recording is
incorporated into a new work. More specifically, digital sampling has been described as:
[T]he conversion of analog sound waves into a digital code. The digital code that describes
the sampled music ... can then be reused, manipulated or combined with other digitalized
or recorded sounds using a machine with digital data processing capabilities, such as a ...
computerized synthesizer.
Id (alterations in original omitted).
175. Examples of sampling use include: Puff Daddy's "Mo Money, Mo Problems," originally
Diana Ross' "I'm Coming Out"; Puff Daddy and Faith Evans' "I'll Be Missing You," originally
Sting's "I'll Be Watching You"; MC Hammer's "You Can't Touch This," originally Rick James' "Su-
perfreak"; and Vanilla Ice's "Ice, Ice, Baby," originally David Bowie's "Under Pressure." Khalilah
L. Liptrot, A Musical Interlude: Sampling Goods vs. Stealing Goods, MEDILLNEWS SERVICE, July
15, 2004, available at http://74.125.45.104/search?q=cache:LGMVJ58EYHsJ:docket
.medill.northwesern.edu/archives/000932.php+A+Musical+lnterviewed:+Sampling+Goods+vs+Steali
ng+Goods&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us.
Vanilla Ice never credited the song to Bowie, or received a license for its use. Id. It is ru-
mored that Vanilla Ice and Bowie settled the dispute out of court. Id.
176. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[S]ampling is
never accidental. . .. When you sample a sound recording you know you are taking another's work
product.").
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the musical composition.!"? A rate set at fifty percent of a compulsory
mechanical rate!" and a rate set at fifty percent of a compulsory public
performance rate'?" will make sample usage efficient. In addition to the
fixed rate, the original author should be listed as co-author of the new
record entitled to royalties.l'" Songwriters, producers, music publishing
companies, record companies, and the performing rights societies will all
benefit from market certainty for credit and the payment of royalties.
Parodies would be included and qualify for the sample rate.l'"
For the purposes of this proposed statutory section, a "sample"
would be defined as "any use of the music without the lyrics or the lyrics
without the music, or any modification or combination of the music and
lyrics with additional music and lyrics such that the original musical
work consists of fifty percent or less of the content of the new work.,,182
Any usage containing more than fifty percent of the original work would
not qualify for this proposed statutory sample rate. Rearrangement of
more than fifty percent of the original work is either a cover of the
original work, requiring a compulsory license, or a derivative work for
the original work, requiring negotiation with the copyright owner.
D. LimitFair Use for Music
The fair use docrrine'F needs a serious overhaul. While a complete
overhaul of the fair use doctrine is beyond the scope of this article, Con-
gress should remove musical works and sound recordings from the cov-
erage of 17 U.S.c. § 107184 and create a new § 107A185 to cover music.
Excepting musical works and sound recordings from the current fair use
section should not be difficult. Congress can accomplish this exception
by simply adding a sentence to § 107 that reads, "This section shall not
apply to musical works and sound recordings." Adding a new section to
clarify the "fair use" of music is necessary to make the royalty scheme
work most efficiently and to maximize income for the copyright owners.
Unlike courts' current interpretations of § 107,186 the preamble of
177. See id. at 796 n.3 (noting separate copyrights for sound recording and underlying composi-
tions); Peters' June 21 Statement, supra note 34 ("[I]n order to use a digital sample without violating
the Copyright Act, an artist must obtain two different licenses; one from the owner of the master re-
cording and one from the owner of the copyright to the underlying composition.").
178. 17 U.S.C § 115 (2006).
179. 17 U.S.C § 114 (2006) (as modified by pending legislation).
180. This is the standard practice, the exception being" Ice, Ice Baby" referred to in footnote
175.
181. See discussion infra Section V.D.
182. See Bridgeport Music, fnc.• 410 F.3d at 802, 804 n.18 (6th Cir. 2005) ("If the sample physi-
cally copied any portion of another's copyrighted sound recording, then infringement should be
found.").
183. 17 U.S.C § 107 (2006). The full text of § 107 is included in footnote 152.
184. fd
185. Section 107A would parallel 17 U.S.C § 106A.
186. David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensively, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1274 (2004)
(" As has often been remarked, it is only after litigating a case all the way to the Supreme Court level
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the new section must be followed at all times.l'" If the use does not fit
into the specifically enumerated uses set forth in the preamble of
§ 107A, there can be no fair use and analysis of the fair use factors need
not be undertaken. The only uses that should qualify for a "fair use" of
music are news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 188 The
new § 107A should read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, the fair use of a musical work or
sound recording, for purposes such as news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the fac-
tors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(3) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Criticism and comment will only be considered a fair use if they fit
into the news reporting exception.l'" Parody is specifically excluded as
fair use but may qualify for a compulsory sample license.'?" This new
system will bring certainty to the marketplace and avoid unnecessary
transaction costs and litigation.l'"
E. Music Rights Organizations or "One-Stop Shopping"
Congress should adopt Peters' suggestion that one or more entities
should control all of the licenses necessary to record and distribute mu-
sical works to facilitate "one-stop shopping" for content users.192 Con-
that one truly knows whether a previous utilization qualified as 'fair' or 'unfair. '").
187. Courts have ignored the preamble of § 107 to reach their desired result. See, e.g., MGM v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (praising the Sony decision as "clear" and
an effective means of protecting new technology); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994) (combining discussion of the preamble with the first prong presumably because parody is not
specifically mentioned in the preamble); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
416 (1984) (ignoring the preamble because timeshifting does not fit into any of the enumerated cate-
gories); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (ignoring the preamble to make
internet linking fit as a "fair use").
188. These uses are included in the preamble of § 107.
189. Music reviews fit into this section.
190. Under the proposed section 107A, a parody would not qualify as a fair use. See Campbell,
510 U.S. 569 (1994) (finding 2 Live Crew's use of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman" was a parody be-
cause the use was transformative). Under the new section 107A, 2 Live Crew would have to pay a
royalty for use of Orbison's bass line and lyrics. Any use of the musical work or sound recording of
another would require a royalty payment.
191. Telephone Interview with Jay Levy, Weird Al Yankovic's Manager (July 3, 2(03) (cited in
SHERRI BURR & WILLIAM HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON FILM,
TELEVISION, AND MUSIC 750 (2004)). Levy stated, "[Weird] AI believes that getting permission to
use the songs is the ethical thing to do. It's not a legal issue to him; it's the right thing to do. The
main reason Al gets permission from the artist is because he wants the artist to be in on the joke." [d.
192. See Peters' June 21 Statement, supra note 34.
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gress must also allow the performing rights societies'?' and the Harry
Fox Agency'?' to evolve into the Music Rights Organizations that Peters
proposes. 195 As she stated in her proposal, Congress will have to pass
specific legislation to exempt the organizations from antitrust liability.!"
While it will cause some short-term market confusion, the surviving
MROs will be able to efficiently license the music in their catalogue for
any and all uses.
Music publishing companies will remain relevant to songwriters for
song placement.l'" Synchronization licensesl'" and grand rights li-
censes'?? are not subject to § 115.200 Music publishing companies will
continue to have a role in developing songwriters and placing their mu-
sic, a role not currently filled by the performance rights societies and not
contemplated by the proposed changes to create MROs.
VI. CONCLUSION
These proposals 'should satisfy some of the concerns of the record
companies and the copyright owners. Although creating a compulsory
sample license and modifying the fair use doctrine for music will be con-
troversial in the short term, the long-term effect should be to provide
market stability and facilitate the growth of the music business in the fu-
ture. Modification of the fair use doctrine will require anyone who uses
the musical work or sound recording of another to pay for that use. A
statutory sample license will take the uncertainty out of the cost for us-
ing a sample.
Marybeth Peters is almost right. With a few additional proposals
that place the rights of songwriters, performing artists, and copyright
owners on par with the record companies, modifying 17 U.s.c. §§ 114
and 115 should benefit all of the players in the music business.
193. ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC are performing rights societies. See supra notes 94-96.
194. The National Music Publisher's Association established the Harry Fox Agency (HFA) in
1927 "to act as an information source, clearinghouse, and monitoring service for licensing musical
copyrights. . .. HFA licenses the largest percentage of the mechanical and digital uses of music in
the United States on CDs, digital services, records, tapes and imported phonorecords." Harry Fox
Agency, Inc., About HFA, http://www.harryfox.com/public/HFA.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
] 95. See Peters' June 21 Statement, supra note 34.
]96. Id
197. Film, television, theater, and advertising placement will continue to be the function of music
publishing companies.
198. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62 n.4 (2d Cir. ]996) ("A synchro-
nization license is required if a copyrighted musical composition is to be used in 'timed-relation' or
synchronization with an audiovisual work. Most commonly, synch licenses are necessary when copy-
righted music is included in movies and commercials. The 'synch' right is a right exclusively enjoyed
by the copyright owner.") (internal citations omitted).
199. See Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50, 55 n.6 (2d Cir. ]972) (distinguish-
ing between small and grand rights performances (dramatic rights), stating, "A performance of a mu-
sical composition is dramatic if it aids in telling a story; otherwise, it is not.")
200. See 17 U.S.c. § 115 (2006).
